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[W]e are handicapped... by policies based on old myths, rather than
current realities.
Senator J. William Fulbright'
I. INTRODUCTION
More than twenty years ago, the "greenhouse" effect was identified
to policymakers at the highest level of the United States government as an
environmental threat of potentially mammoth proportions.2 Since then,
greenhouse gases (GHGs) that cause global warming have accumulated in
the atmosphere at an unprecedented rate.' Only now, more than two
decades later, have policy responses been contemplated and negotiations
on a multilateral convention on climate change initiated.
Recent progress in negotiating and implementing an international
regime for regulating chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, and other
chemicals that deplete the stratospheric ozone layer has fueled optimism
about the potential for success of international undertakings to protect the
climate from global warming. Emissions of CFCs and halons are governed
by the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna
Convention)4 and the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol).5 The Vienna Convention is often
1. 110 CONG. REC. S6227 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1964) (statement of Sen. Fulbright).
2. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 93-105 (1970).
3. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC
SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT xv-xvii (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter IPCC
SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT].
4. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S.
No. 11097, reprinted in [Reference File] Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:3101 (Jan. 1989), and
in 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
5. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987)
[hereinafter Montreal Protocol], amended and adjusted, S. TREATY Doc. No. 4, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in [Reference File] Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:3151
(Mar. 1991), and in 30 I.L.M. 539 (1991), and in 1 Y.B. INT'L ENvTL. L. 591 (1990)
[hereinafter Montreal Protocol as amended]. For a history of the negotiations leading
to the Montreal Protocol and its 1990 revisions, see generally RICHARD E. BENEDICK,
OzONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET (1990); SHARON
ROAN, OZONE CRISIS: THE 15-YEAR EVOLUTION OF A SUDDEN GLOBAL EMERGENCY
(1989); Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, Building a Monitoring and Compliance Regime
Under the Montreal Protocol, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 519 (1991); Dale S. Bryk, The
[Vol. 2: 79
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described as a "framework" agreement whose purpose is to establish an
institutional basis for cooperation in research, exchange of information, and
discussion of substantive policy measures like those contained in the
Montreal Protocol. Following the entry into force of amendments adopted
in 1990,6 the Montreal Protocol will require a total phase-out by industrial-
ized countries in consumption of nineteen of these chemicals by the end of
the century.
The connection between stratospheric ozone depletion and "green-
house" warming is particularly significant. CFCs themselves are potent
contributors to global warming. Despite their relatively low concentrations
compared to other GHGs, CFCs and halons are responsible for twelve
percent of the global warming potential of current GHG emissions.' Per
Montreal Protocol and Recent Developments to Protect the Ozone Layer, 15 HARV.
ENvTL. L. REv. 275 (1991); Jamison Koehler & Scott A. Hajost, The Montreal Protocol:
A Dynamic Agreement for Protecting the Ozone Layer, 19 AMBIO 82 (1990); Peter M.
Morrisette, The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, 29 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 793 (1989); Recent Developments, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185 (1988). See
also infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
6. The Montreal Protocol as adopted in 1987 requires a 50% reduction in con-
sumption of five CFCs, as measured against the base year of 1986, by the end of the
century. The original Montreal Protocol also freezes consumption of three halons at
1986 levels. In June 1990, the parties to the Montreal Protocol adopted amendments
and adjustments. See infra text accompanying note 85 (discussing difference between
amendments and adjustments). The adjustments, which became effective on March 7,
1991, accelerate the reduction schedule for the eight CFCs and three halons covered by
the original agreement, requiring a total phase-out in consumption of those chemicals
by the end of the century. The accompanying amendments, which were scheduled to
enter into force on January 1, 1992 provided they had been ratified by 20 parties to the
original Montreal Protocol, would establish similar requirements for 10 additional fully
halogenated CFCs, carbon tetrachloride (CC14 ), and methyl chloroform (C2H3C13).
Nonetheless, as of early 1992, the 1990 Amendments had not entered into force because
they had received fewer than the necessary 20 ratifications. Recent scientific reports
have documented the potential for unexpectedly high losses of stratospheric ozone over
North America. See, e.g., Ozone-Hole Conditions Spreading: High Concentrations of Key
Pollutants Discovered over U.S., WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1992, at Al. In response, the
President recently announced that the United States will accelerate the ban on ozone-
depleting chemicals. See White House Press Release, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 249
(Feb. 17, 1992); see also U.S. to End CFC Production 4 Years Earlier Than Planned:
Schedule for Other Ozone-Protecting Action Reexamined, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1992, at
A2.
7. IPCC ScIENTm'Ic ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 51-54. The value of 12% is based
on the Global Warming Potential (GWP) of 1990 emissions, calculated over a 100-year
time horizon. CFCs' share of the radiative forcing increase between 1980 and 1990 is
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molecule in the atmosphere, these chemicals are up to 20,000 times more
potent in absorbing infrared radiation (heat energy) than carbon dioxide
(C02), the most important GHG originating from human activities.'
Although the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol help to address the
global warming problem in an indirect, incremental manner by controlling
emissions of CFCs and halons, those instruments are far from a compre-
hensive GHG regime. In particular, the Montreal Protocol does not specify
that alternatives to the CFCs and halons controlled by the agreement must
be or even should be greenhouse-friendly.9
Major reductions in emissions of GHGs other than CFCs, including
C0 2, methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N20), are necessary to assure the
stability of the biosphere. National commitments by individual countries
and concerted action by groups of large emitting nations, such as the Group
of Seven (G-7) major industrialized nations, are crucial for achieving
progress toward meaningful reductions in GHG emissions. Binding
multilateral instruments are also needed to attack global warming on a
global scale. New international institutions and decision-making processes
may be desirable or even essential.
The desirability of a "framework" or "umbrella" treaty analogous to
the Vienna Convention, with associated ancillary agreements analogous to
the Montreal Protocol, has dominated the discussion of multilateral change
24%. Id. at 55 tbl.2.2. This differs from the GWP-based value of 12% because changes
in radiative forcing over a given period do not fully reflect the differences in atmospher-
ic lifetimes among the GHGs. See, e.g., id. at 54-57; Daniel A. Lashof & Dilip R. Ahuja,
Relative Contributions of Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Global Warming, 344 NATURE
529 (1990). The above values do not account for the radiative effect of ozone depletion
caused by CFCs. A very recent U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP) report has
suggested that the cooling effect of ozone depletion in the lower stratosphere observed
during the 1980s may have offset the radiative forcing increase due to the direct effect
of the CFC concentration increase observed during that same period. Executive
Summary: WMO / UNEP Scientific Assessment of Stratospheric Ozone, World
Meteorological Organization, WMO No. 473 (Oct. 22, 1991) [hereinafter WMO Ozone
Assessment]. No estimate of the net GWP of CFCs, including the ozone depletion effect,
is available at this time.
8. IPCC SCIENTIFIc ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 62-63.
9. But see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 612, 104 Stat.
2399, 2648-70 (1990), 42 U.S.C.S. § 7671k (Law. Co-op. Supp. June 1991) (safe
alternatives policy containing directive to Environmental Protection Agency to
promulgate regulations making it unlawful to replace named ozone-depleting chemicals
with substitutes that may have adverse effects on human health or environment if
environmentally benign alternatives available); 57 Fed. Reg. 1984 (1992) (request for
data and advance notice of proposed rulemaking pursuant to § 612).
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instruments for some time. Unfortunately much of that interchange,
especially in the United States, has crystallized, if not ossified, around a
rigid interpretation of the precedential importance of the stratospheric
ozone negotiations."° The purpose of this article is to examine the
implications of the Vienna-Montreal model and to stimulate debate on the
form and substance of a future global GHG regime that would include all
GHGs, not just CFCs.
II. THE EARLY NEED FOR MULTILATERAL
GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROLS
"The Earth is one but the world is not."" With these words, the
World Commission on Environment and Development underscored the
principal difficulty in formulating a concerted attack on international
environmental threats in a world where the primary actors are indepen-
dent, sovereign, coequal States. Among these environmental threats, few,
if any, rival the greenhouse effect. Without attempting a comprehensive
review of the scientific, policy, and legal issues associated with global
warming, 2 it is important to highlight the overarching requirements that
10. See, e.g., James K Sebenius, Crafting a Winning Coalition: Negotiating a Regime
to Control Global Warming, in GREENHOUSE WARMING: NEGOTIATING A GLOBAL REGIME
69, 70 (Jessica Mathews ed., 1991) ("the current 'general-framework-convention-
followed-by-specific-protocols' approach to addressing climate change has practically
assumed the status of conventional wisdom").
11. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEv., OUR COMMON FUTURE 27 (1987) (report of
independent World Commission on Environment and Development, chaired by Dr. Gro
Harlem Bruntland, Prime Minister of Norway, prepared at request of U.N. General
Assembly).
12. See generally IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3; INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC IMPACTS ASSESSMENT
(W.J.McG. Tegart et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter IPCC IMPACTS ASSESSMENT]; INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC RESPONSE
STRATEGIES (1991) [hereinafter IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES]; ROBERT H. BOYLE &
MICHAEL OPPENHEIMER, DEAD HEAT: THE RACE AGAINST THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT
(1990); THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL WARMING (Dean E. Abrahamson ed., 1989); GREEN-
HOUSE WARMING: NEGOTIATING A GLOBAL REGIME (Jessica T. Mathews ed., 1991); INT'L
COUNCIL OF SCI. UNIONS, UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME & WORLD METEOROLOGI-
CAL ORGANIZATION, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE ASSESSMENT
OF THE ROLE OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND OF OTHER GREENHOUSE GASES IN CLIMATE
VARIATIONS AND ASSOCIATED IMPACTS (1986) (report of conference held under auspices
of World Climate Programme at Villach, Austria, Oct. 9-15, 1985); FRANCESCA LYMAN
ET AL., THE GREENHOUSE TRAP (1990); IRVING MINTZER, A MATTER OF DEGREES (1987);
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an international strategy on this compelling issue must address.
A. An International Issue
Greenhouse warming, like stratospheric ozone depletion, is a global
problem. The most important greenhouse gases-CO2, CFCs, CH 4 (meth-
ane), and N20 (nitrous oxide)-remain in the atmosphere for many years
after being emitted. 3 As a result, their atmospheric concentrations are
essentially the same in all regions of the world. Emissions anywhere on the
planet have the same impact on climate, regardless of their geographic
origin.
14
Global warming and ozone depletion share a number of other
characteristics with significant policy consequences. In contrast to some
other international issues like acid rain, regional solutions, while incremen-
tally helpful, cannot resolve these problems entirely. Current patterns of
industrialization result in an enhanced greenhouse effect and stratospheric
ozone depletion. Both threaten long-term, potentially catastrophic harm,
whose precise delineation is complicated by a range of uncertainty.
Multilateral cooperation is even more important for global warming
than for ozone depletion. GHG emissions are more varied and more widely
distributed around the globe than the CFC emissions that cause strato-
spheric ozone depletion. Although CO 2 and methane emissions of fossil fuel
NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING (1991); NAT'L
RESOURCES COUNCIL, OZONE DEPLETION, GREENHOUSE GASES, AND CLIMATE CHANGE
(1989); NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, COOLING THE GREENHOUSE: VITAL FIRST STEPS
TO COMBAT GLOBAL WARMING (1989); POLICY OPTIONS FOR STABILIZING GLOBAL
CLIMATE (Daniel A. Lashof & Dennis A. Tirpak eds., 1990) (report to Congress of U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency) [hereinafter POLICY OPTIONS]; THE POTENTIAL
EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES (Joel B. Smith & Dennis
A. Tirpak eds., 1989) (report to Congress of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency);
UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME & WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION,
DEVELOPING POLICIES FOR RESPONDING TO CLIMATIC CHANGE (1988) (report of
conference held at Villach, Austria, Sept. 28-Oct. 2, 1987 and Bellagio, Italy, Nov. 9-13,
1987) [hereinafter Bellagio Report); U.S. CONGRESS, OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,
CHANGING BY DEGREES: STEPS TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GASES (1991); U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY & UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME, EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN
STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE (1986) (4-volume proceedings of conference
held at Leesburg, Virginia, June 16-20, 1986); David A. Wirth, Climate Chaos, 74
FOREIGN POLY 3 (1989).
13. IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 7, 48, 59.
14. See id. ch. 1.
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origin, such as gasoline consumption and natural gas leaks, are highly
concentrated in the industrialized countries that are the dominant CFC
consumers, CO2 releases from deforestation and methane emissions from
rice paddies and domestic animals emanate largely from developing
countries. For example, the United States, Japan, and the European
Community accounted for seventy percent of global CFC production in
1985. This same configuration of countries accounts for only about forty
percent of total GHG emissions.15
No comprehensive solution is possible without the active participation
of developing countries and a GHG agreement must address their special
needs. On the one hand, developing countries have caused little of the
problem and industrialized countries must bear the bulk of the responsibili-
ty. On the other hand, as their economic development accelerates, Third
World countries may account for the bulk of GHG emissions by the middle
of the next century. Moreover, developing countries, with fewer resources
to adapt to environmental disturbances, stand to suffer disproportionately
from rapid climate change. An international solution that provides
incentives for the participation of developing countries while equitably
distributing the responsibility for implementing solutions is essential to
combating greenhouse warming.
B. Winners and Losers
Although the buildup of GHG concentrations is uniform around the
globe, the impacts of the resulting climate change will vary from region to
region. This has led to the erroneous suggestion that there will be
"winners" and "losers" from global warming. 6 So long as this notion
persists, there is a serious risk that broad international agreement on
environmentally meaningful reductions in GHG emissions will be stymied.
The assumption that there will be winners from global warming is often
based on a comparison of current GHG levels with a future, hypothetical
climate regime in equilibrium, with CO2 concentrations at double their
preindustrial levels. This arbitrary and totally unrealistic scenario was
developed solely for the convenience of climate modelers, who needed
simple assumptions for their calculations.
15. POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 12, at 148.
16. E.g., Thomas C. Schelling, Climatic Change: Implications for Welfare and Policy,
in CHANGING CLIMATE: REPORT OF THE CARBON DIOXIDE ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE 454
(1983).
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The very concept of "winning" implies the existence of a stable
warmer climate, which will not occur unless the current warming trend is
halted. There is no natural endpoint to climate disruption from the
greenhouse effect. Moreover, no single country will be able to guarantee
that the phenomenon is arrested at an optimal point for that country. The
only way to ensure that there will be any winners is to guarantee that all
countries are winners by reversing the global buildup of GHGs in the
atmosphere.
The long atmospheric lifetimes of GHGs necessitate major reductions
in emissions from current levels. Even after these reductions, atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs will fall only very slowly. The heat capacity of the
oceans will further delay the climatic response by decades more.' 7 Indeed,
temperatures might continue to rise for many years even after the
elimination of all anthropogenic GHG emissions.'" Moreover, the required
changes in utility and transportation infrastructure will take years or even
decades to accomplish following decisions to embark on a GHG emissions
reduction program. 9 The likelihood of positive feedbacks, through which
the warming itself further accelerates GHG emissions rates, raises the
further frightening possibility that human efforts to reduce emissions could
be overwhelmed by natural processes such as the release of methane from
Arctic regions. Once such a crisis has been reached, it will be too late to
act.
C. Policy Implications of Scientific Uncertainties
Considering both what is known and what is not known about global
warming, prudent public policy demands the implementation of measures
to avoid the most serious risks. The question of how to react to scientific
uncertainties was an explicit component of the Montreal ozone negotia-
tions. Policy discussions concerning global warming, however, have
generally not been guided by this crucial principle.
For instance, a widely quoted statement avers that the radiative
equivalent of doubling the concentration of C02 would "most likely" result
in a global warming of 1.5-4.5°C. This statement is based on a series of
17. POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 12, at 114.
18. Id.
19. Replacing coal-fueled power plants with renewable energy systems and building
high-speed rail to reduce the need for air travel are examples of necessary changes. See
infra note 56 (discussing the Rational Academy of Sciences' proposal of such measures).
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assessments by the National Academy of Sciences and the United States
Department of Energy.2" However, when biogeochemical feedback
processes21 are incorporated into climate models and standard deviations
are accounted for, the temperature rise resulting from an initial doubling
of CO2 concentrations might increase to more than 6°C. A warming of as
much as 8-10°C cannot be ruled out.
22
TABLE 1
Carbon Budget to Limit Warming to 2.50C Above Preindustrial Levels
Climate Current Warming CO2 Concentration Carbon Budget
Sensitivity Commitment Limit (Billion Tons)
(2 x C02)
6.0°C 3.1°C 330 ppm -
4.5 2.3 360 30
3.0 1.5 440 340
1.5 0.8 760 1600
Source: Data based on research and calculations by Dr. Daniel Lashof.
A useful way to think about the policy implications of this scientific
uncertainty is to examine the policies needed to limit climatic change to a
given level. For example, consider the policy aim of confining warming
commitments to a target of 2.5°C above preindustrial levels by the year
2030. Achieving this goal would result in an average global temperature at
or below the maximum global temperature experienced during the last
several million years. This limit is also consistent with the goal of
preventing the maximum rate of warming from exceeding 0.1°C per decade,
20. PCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 145; NAT'L ACAD. OF SL,
CHANGING CLIMATE 28 (1983); Frederick M. Luther, Projecting the Climatic Effects of
Increasing Carbon Dioxide: Volume Summary, in PROJECTING THE CLIMATIC EFFECTS
OF INCREASING CARBON DIOXIDE 261, 266 (Michael C. MacCracken & Frederick M.
Luther eds., 1985) (Department of Energy report).
21. Biogeochemical feedback processes are changes in emissions or removal of GHGs
induced by global warming.
22. Daniel A. Lashof, The Dynamic Greenhouse: Feedback Processes That May
Influence Future Concentrations of Atmospheric Trace Gases and Climatic Change, 14
CLIMATIC CHANGE 213, 238-39 (1989).
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proposed by seminal international policy workshops held in Villach and
Bellagio.2"
Table 1 shows the current warming commitment and the C02
concentration limit that would be required to prevent a global warming of
more than 2.5°C for various climate sensitivities to doubling CO2 between
1.5' and 60C.24 The current warming commitment is the global tempera-
ture increase above preindustrial levels that would occur in equilibrium if
GHG concentrations were frozen at today's levels. The C0 2 concentration
limit is based on the assumption that other GHG concentrations can be
stabilized at today's levels. The last column shows the total amount of C02
that could be emitted between now and when CO2 concentrations are
stabilized-for example the year 2030-assuming that fifty-five percent of
the emitted C02 remains in the atmosphere over this period. This analysis
shows that if the climate system turns out to be quite sensitive to increases
in GHG concentrations, it may already be impossible to prevent unprece-
dented climatic change. With even a modest climate sensitivity, aggressive
policies to eliminate fossil fuel dependence still would be required.
Given this situation, the only prudent policy is to minimize the risk
of catastrophic climatic change by reducing C02 emissions to allow atmo-
spheric concentrations of this gas to begin declining at the earliest possible
date. It is both necessary and feasible to set a policy course consistent with
preventing CO 2 concentrations from exceeding 400 parts per million (ppm).
This could prevent a long-term warming commitment of more than 2.5°C
so long as climate sensitivity turns out to be below 3.6°C. If subsequent
scientific studies show that the climate system is definitely much less
sensitive than this value, then this constraint might be relaxed. A mid-
course correction of this sort would have few if any adverse economic
consequences, as most if not all of the policies needed to achieve this target
will prove beneficial in their own right. On the other hand, any delay in
establishing policies consistent with the above goal will be extremely costly,
both economically and environmentally, if it is subsequently shown that the
climate system is at least this sensitive. For example, the continent-size
ozone "hole" over Antarctica, which appeared suddenly and was not
23. Bellagio Report, supra note 12, at 25.
24. Climate sensitivity is defined here as the eventual increase in global average
temperature that would result from doubling the atmospheric concentration of C0 2 from
preindustrial levels. The range of climate sensitivities evaluated here includes the most
likely range according to the IPCC, as well as a higher value based on the risk of
positive biogeochemical feedbacks.
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predicted by scientific models,25 compellingly demonstrates that uncertain-
ties cut both ways. Similarly, an unexpectedly high potential for alarming
losses of stratospheric ozone over North America recently has been
reported." Scientific projections may not only overstate risks, but also
understate them, and the potential for unpleasant surprises always exists.
The integration of scientific uncertainty into policy decisions has now
been sufficiently widely accepted that the doctrine has acquired a name:
the "precautionary principle."27 However, the United States has relied on
scientific and economic uncertainties as a justification for rejecting actions
needed to protect the climate unless such actions are independently
warranted." This misleadingly-dubbed "no regrets" policy turns the
salutary precautionary principle on its head.
III. RECENT STEPS TOWARD A GREENHOUSE
GAS CONVENTION
In the past several years, there has been a great deal of international
activity on scientific, technical, and policy aspects of the greenhouse issue.
25. See J.C. Farman et al., Large Losses of Total Ozone in Antarctica Reveal Seasonal
C10, INO. Interaction, 315 NATURE 207 (1985).
26. See supra note 6.
27. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary
Principle, ENV'T, Sept. 1991, at 4; James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary
Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global
Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1 (1991). The precautionary approach has
firm roots in domestic environmental law. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) ("Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence
difficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge, the regulations designed to protect the public health, and the decision that
of an expert administrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and
effect. Such proof may be impossible to obtain if the precautionary purpose of the
statute is to be served."); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 528 (8th Cir. 1975)
(en banc) ("In the context of [the Federal Water Pollution Control Act], we believe that
Congress used the term 'endangering' in a precautionary or preventive sense, and,
therefore, evidence of potential harm as well as actual harm comes within the purview
of that term.").
28. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GLOBAL WARMING: ADMINISTRATION APPROACH
CAUTIOUS PENDING VALIDATION OF THREAT (1990); D. Allan Bromley, The Making of
a Greenhouse Policy, ISSUES IN SCI. AND TECH., Fall 1990, at 55, 57-59; C. Boyden Gray
& David B. Rivkin, Jr., A "No Regrets" Environmental Policy, 83 FOREIGN POL'Y 47
(1991) (discussing the Bush Administration's "no regrets" policy).
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Multilateral attention to the causes, consequences, and control of global
warming has accelerated. As a result, a number of significant international
undertakings relevant to the form, content, and timing of multilateral GHG
instruments have been initiated.
A. The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC)
The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change (INC), established by U.N. General
Assembly resolution29 and reporting directly to that body, is the forum in
which negotiations on the anticipated framework convention on climate
change are taking place. According to the General Assembly's mandate,
negotiations on the agreement are to be complete and the convention ready
for signature by the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development,
to be held in Brazil in June 1992. The work of the INC has been distribut-
ed between two working groups, one on commitments and one on mecha-
nisms. The fourth session of negotiations, held in Geneva in December
1991, produced a unified negotiating text, but considerable disagreement
on fundamental issues remains. In particular, the inclusion of targets and
timetables for emissions of CO2 by industrialized countries was strenuously
opposed by the United States, which is now effectively isolated on this
question."° The twelve European Community States have called for a
29. G.A. Res. 212, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 148, U.N. Doc. A/45/49
(1990), reprinted in 21 ENVTL. PoLY & L. 76 (1991) (establishing the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee).
30. See, e.g., Global Warming Rift Threatens Treaty: U.N. Talks Close with
Industrialized Nations, Third World at Odds, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1992, at A3. There
recently has been a marked trend toward very specific regulatory regimes that have
measurable procedural and substantive standards for implementation by individual
States. In addition to the Montreal Protocol, supra note 5, the Protocol to the 1979
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur
Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least Thirty Per Cent, July 8, 1985,
reprinted in [Reference File] Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:3021 (Mar. 1989), and in 27
I.L.M. 707 (1988) [hereinafter Sulphur Protocol], as its name suggests, requires each
State party to accomplish a uniform percentage cutback in pollution, measured from an
agreed base year, by a firm deadline. The Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen
Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes, Oct. 31, 1988, reprinted in 18 ENVTL. POLY &
L. 228 (1988), and in [Reference File] Intl Envt Rep. (BNA) 21:3041 (Jan. 1989), and
in 28 I.L.M. 214 (1989), sets out highly specific technology-based standards for pollution
control within the context of an overall emissions limitation. The Basel Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,
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specific agreement by June 1992 for "the stabilization of C02 emissions by
the year 2000 in general at 1990 levels by industrialised countries
individually or jointly."3' All other members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, except the United States and
Turkey, have taken similar positions. 2 The stances of these countries
differ somewhat in specificity with regard to dates, base years, and
coverage, which varies from C02 alone to all GHGs not controlled by the
Montreal Protocol. For example, Japan has adopted an ambiguous
formulation, calling for the convention to require that:
Industrialised countries, in particular, shall make the best effort aimed at
stabilising emissions of C02 or C02 and other greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol as soon as possible, for example by the
year 2000 in general at 1990 levels, recognising the differences in
approach and in starting-point in the formulation of objectives. 3
This roadblock in the negotiations has, moreover, effectively stymied
any discussion of obligations for developing countries, which, as described
above, are essential to the success of a multilateral strategy. At the fourth
round of negotiations, in December 1991, it became apparent that the
interests of developing countries are highly divergent and that the Third
World could not effectively negotiate as a bloc. While petroleum-exporting
Mar. 22, 1989, S. TREATY DOC. No. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 19
ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 68 (1989), and in [Reference File] Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:3701
(May 1989), and in 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989), which enters into force on May 5, 1992,
mandates detailed procedures governing the export of municipal trash and toxic waste.
Of course, targets and timetables are well accepted as regulatory strategies within the
domestic context. For instance, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990), 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7401-7671q (Law. Co-op. Supp. June 1991),
incorporate numerous deadlines and numerical goals. In particular, to combat acid rain
those Amendments require a 10 million ton reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions by the
year 2000. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat.
2585 (1990), 42 U.S.C.S. § 7651 (Law. Co-op Supp. June 1991).
31. Intervention by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Community and
Member States, Nairobi, Kenya (Third Session of the INC) (transcript available at
Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, D.C.).
32. See Ministerial Declaration, Second World Climate Conference (statement from
international meeting in Geneva, Oct. 29-Nov. 7, 1990), reprinted in 20 ENVTL. PoLY
& L. 220 (1990), and in 1 Y.B. INT'L ENvTL. L. 473 (1990) [hereinafter SWCC
Ministerial Declaration].
33. Statement of Japan at the Third Session of the INC, Nairobi, Kenya, reprinted
in Japan Switches to 'Best Effort', ECO, Sept. 9, 1991, at 1 (cooperative newsletter
published by nongovernmental environmental groups at major international conferences
since the Stockholm Environment Conference in 1972).
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States like Saudi Arabia and large developing countries like China, India,
and Brazil have demonstrated varying levels of skepticism about the
proposed convention, small island States like Vanuatu have pressed for a
strong instrument. Even if the United States were to remove its objection
to the stabilization goal for CO 2 by industrialized countries, either by
modifying its policy to accommodate that goal or acknowledging that it
would not sign and ratify a convention with that requirement, 4 it is
probably already too late to make significant progress on the considerably
more difficult but equally compelling question of the role of developing
countries in a "global bargain."
B. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (PCC)
The IPCC is now the principal ongoing multilateral vehicle for
scientific and technical assessment of the greenhouse issue. The IPCC,
which met for the first time in November 1988, was created under the
auspices of the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) with an initial mandate to study the
climate change issue and to report to the Second World Climate Conference
(SWCC) in fall 1990. More than thirty-five countries participate in IPCC
activities, which are distributed among three working groups: a science
working group; a working group studying social and environmental impacts
of climate change; and a response strategies working group charged with
identifying policies to adapt to and mitigate the effects of global warming.,
The first phase of the IPCC's work, which predated the current
negotiations on a framework climate convention, concluded in 1990 with
the adoption of the Panel's First Assessment Report, consisting of reports
from the three working groups.35 At the Second World Climate Confer-
ence36 representatives of 137 countries considered farther steps on the
global warming issue in light of the IPCC's report. Even now that formal
convention negotiations have begun, as described above, under the auspices
34. For instance, United States acid rain policy at the time of the conclusion of the
Sulphur Protocol, supra note 30, was inconsistent with the requirements of that
instrument. Instead of impeding the negotiations by insisting on an agreement
consistent with domestic policy, the United States declined to accept the obligations in
a more ambitious instrument that was responsive to the needs and desires of the other
parties to the negotiation.
35. See IPCC SCIENTIFIc ASSESSMENT, supra note 3; IPCC IMPACTS ASSESSMENT,
supra note 12; IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES, supra note 12.
36. See SWCC Ministerial Declaration, supra note 32.
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of the INC, the IPCC continues to provide technical background informa-
tion for the climate treaty discussions. In particular, the science working
group (Working Group I) is scheduled to supplement its 1990 Scientific
Assessment Report in early 1992. This revision will update information on
selected topics including global warming potentials, national emissions
inventories, model validation, and climate observations.
C. Nonbinding Declarations and Statements
Over the past several years, a number of multilateral conferences
have proven to be important occasions for stimulating international debate
on global warming. The resulting instruments include:
" The final statement of an international meeting hosted by the government
of Canada in mid-1988;37
" Three major U.N. General Assembly resolutions;8
" The conclusions of a group of international lawyers convened by the
government of Canada in February 1989;"9
37. The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security (statement from
international meeting sponsored by Government of Canada in Toronto June 27-30,
1988), reprinted in 5 AM1. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 515 (1990) [hereinafter Toronto
Conference Statement]. More than 300 individuals from 48 countries, including
government officials, scientists, and representatives of industry and environmental
organizations attended this conference. The following recommendations from the
conference were prominent: (1) the necessity for a "comprehensive global convention as
a framework for protocols on the protection of the atmosphere"; (2) the establishment
of a "World Atmosphere Fund financed in part by a levy on the fossil fuel consumption
of industrialized countries" to facilitate technology transfer to Third World countries;
and (3) a reduction in "CO 2 emissions by approximately 20 percent of 1988 levels by the
year 2005" as an initial goal. Id. paras. 30, 5, 22.
38. G.A. Res. 212, supra note 29; G.A. Res. 207, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No.
49, at 130, U.N. Doc. A144/49 (1990), reprinted in 20 ENVTL. PoLY & L. 43 (1990); G.A.
Res. 43/53, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 133, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1989),
reprinted in 5 AM1. U. J. INT'L L. & PoLy 525 (1990), and in 19 ENVTL. POLY & L. 27
(1989), and in 28 I.L.M. 1326 (1989). See also G.A. Res. 169, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A146/729 (1991). See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Standing to Challenge
Human Endeavors That Could Change the Climate, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1990)
(discussing G.A. Resolution 43/53).
39. Protection of the Atmosphere: Statement of the Meeting of Legal and Policy
Experts (statement from international meeting sponsored by government of Canada in
Ottawa, Feb. 20-22, 1989), reprinted in 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 529 (1990), and in
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* The declaration of an international meeting attended by seventeen heads
of State in the Hague in March 1989;
40
" The communiqu6s of the G-7 industrialized countries from their three
most recent annual gatherings;
41
19 ENVTL. POLY & L. 78 (1989).
40. This conference was attended by representatives of 24 countries, including 17
heads of state. The resulting declaration emphasizes the desirability of the "negotiation
of the necessary legal instruments to provide an effective and coherent foundation,
institutionally and financially," for a new institutional authority charged with
"combating any further global warming of the atmosphere." The conference recognized
the need for this authority to apportion "fair and equitable assistance" to those
countries that are asked to bear an "abnormal or special burden, in view of the level of
their development and actual responsibility for the deterioration of the atmo-
sphere. . . ."Declaration of the Hague (statement from international meeting sponsored
by government of the Netherlands in the Hague, Mar. 11, 1989), reprinted in 5 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. & POLY 567 (1990), and in 19 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 78 (1989), and in 30 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 417 (1989), and in 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 215 (1989), and in 28 I.L.M.
1308 (1989).
41. The governments of many of the world's largest emitters of C02 and other
GHGs-Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States-are represented at the annual meeting of heads of State of the seven major
industrialized nations. The communiqu6 from the gathering in Paris in July 1989
declared the following:
We believe that the conclusion of a framework or umbrella convention on climate change
to set out general principles or guidelines is urgently required to mobilize and rationalize
the efforts made by the international community .... Specific protocols containing
concrete commitments could be fitted into the framework as scientific evidence requires
and permits.
Economic Declaration (statement of Group of Seven major industrialized nations in
Paris, July 16, 1989), reprinted in 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 571 (1990), and in 19
ENVTL. PoLY & L. 183 (1989), and in 28 I.L.M. 1293 (1989), and in 25 WEEKLY CoMP.
PRES. Doc. 1101 (July 17, 1989). This commitment was reaffirmed at the next two G-7
summits, held in Houston and London in July 1990 and 1991, respectively. See Houston
Economic Declaration (statement of Group of Seven major industrialized nations in
Houston, July 11, 1990), reprinted in 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1073 (July 16,
1990), and in N.Y TIMES, July 12, 1990, at A15; Economic Declaration:.Building World
Partnership (statement of Group of Seven major industrialized nations in London, July
17, 1991), reprinted in 27 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 968 (July 22, 1991), and in N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 1991, at A12.
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" Declarations of ministerial conferences hosted by the Dutch government
in November 198942 and the Norwegian government in May 1990,
4 3
respectively; and
" The SWCC Ministerial Declaration.'
There are numerous examples in international environmental law of
multilateral meetings where political authorities establish an agreed action
agenda, which can then serve as a basis for drafting binding legal
obligations in a subsequent treaty negotiation. For example, the need for
the 1990 amendments to the Montreal Protocol was established by a
meeting in London attended by representatives of 124 nations in March
1989"5 and a statement of 80 countries at the first meeting of the parties
to the Protocol in May 1989.46
42. This conference of 68 environment ministers stressed the necessity for the
adoption of a framework convention "as early as 1991 if possible and no later than at
the Conference of the United Nations on Environment and Development in 1992." In
addition, the conference endorsed the ambitious goal of reversing deforestation to make
forests a net sink for carbon by early in the next century, to be accomplished by "[a]
world net forest growth of 12 million hectares a year .... " Noordwijk Declaration on
Atmospheric Pollution and Climatic Change (statement of ministerial conference
sponsored by government of the Netherlands in Noordwijk, Nov. 7, 1989), reprinted in
5 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & PoLy 592 (1990), and in 19 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 229 (1989), and
in 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 624 (1989).
43. Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region
(statement of ministerial conference sponsored by Government of Norway in Bergen,
May 16, 1990), reprinted in 20 ENVTL. PoLY & L. 100 (1990). This regional meeting,
held under the auspices of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, was attended by
representatives of 34 governments from Europe and North America and was an
intermediate juncture between the release of the report of the World Commission on
Environment and Development and the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development. The conference reaffirmed its
full support for the early completion of the work on a framework convention on climate
change and the development of protocols dealing with, inter alia, greenhouse gases and
forestation, with a view to signing not later than at the 1992 Conference on Environment
and Development.
Id.
44. SWCC Ministerial Declaration, supra note 32.
45. See 19 ENVTL. PoLy & L. 45 (1989).
46. Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer (statement from first
meeting of parties to Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, May 2, 1989), reprinted
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Remarkably early in the succession of nonbinding instruments on
climate change, consensus crystallized around the need for a multilateral
climate convention. As discussed above, however, similar unanimity on the
content of that agreement has yet to emerge. The SWCC Ministerial
Declaration,47 among the most recent and most influential of these
precatory statements of purpose, reiterates the necessity for a global
framework convention on climate change, noting that "the ultimate global
objective should be to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations at a level
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with climate.""
Significantly, the Declaration also stresses the need to stabilize emissions
of non-CFC greenhouse gases and expressly identifies a number of
countries-including the twelve European Community States, Austria,
Canada, Finland, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and
Switzerland-that have committed to achieving that goal.49 The SWCC
final statement also emphasizes the need for funding to assist developing
countries in carrying out their obligations under the proposed conven-
tion.50
IV. AN ENVIRONMENTALLY MEANINGFUL
GREENHOUSE GAS CONVENTION
The rapidity and magnitude of environmentally meaningful actions
is the ultimate test of any combination of national and international policy
responses to the threat of global warming. In strong contrast to the high-
level political consensus on the need for multilateral instruments, there has
been relatively little attention to the environmental goals a GHG conven-
tion should seek to accomplish. The following sections discuss benchmark
tests relevant to the ongoing negotiations.
A. The Ozone Precedent
High expectations about the prospects for a convention to limit
emissions of GHGs other than CFCs and halons regulated by the Montreal
in 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 570 (1990), and in 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 268 (1989),
and in 28 I.L.M. 1335 (1989).
47. SWCC Ministerial Declaration, supra note 32.
48. Id. para. 10.
49. Id. para. 12.
50. Id. paras. 15, 17, 19.
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Protocol arise in large measure from recent progress in negotiating and
implementing the earlier instrument. It is therefore natural that discus-
sions concerning multilateral instruments on climate explicitly have relied
on the structures established in the ozone negotiations that led to the
Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol. However, there is a serious
risk that this precedent may be misinterpreted to impede rather than
advance environmentally meaningful actions.
States negotiating under UNEP auspices to reduce threats to the
stratospheric ozone layer made an explicit decision to undertake a two-
component process. One product was to be a so-called "framework"
multilateral convention of an essentially procedural character that would
establish an institutional basis for cooperation in research, exchange of
information, and discussion of substantive policy measures. Ancillary
agreements known as "protocols" containing substantive regulatory
measures would be appended to this convention.
The process-oriented ozone umbrella treaty evolved into the Vienna
Convention concluded in March 1985. The allusions to a "framework"
convention in the SWCC Ministerial Declaration and earlier conference
statements are conscious references to this instrument. The Vienna
Convention itself contains no substantive requirements for specific
regulatory actions to protect stratospheric ozone. Instead, it embodies only
a vague, unenforceable exhortation to protect the stratospheric ozone layer
through the implementation of "appropriate measures."5
The history of the ozone negotiations demonstrates that process and
substance on global atmospheric issues are not mutually exclusive, but
intimately interrelated. Negotiations on a CFC protocol, which eventually
became the Montreal Protocol, proceeded simultaneously with deliberations
on the convention up to the adoption of the convention in early 1985. For
a considerable portion of the negotiations, when consideration of the two
instruments proceeded in tandem, a number of countries, including the
United States, called for a mandatory CFC protocol to which all parties to
the convention would have to adhere.52 When negotiations on the CFC
protocol broke down, the Convention alone was adopted.53 Renegotiation
of the protocol after a scheduled one-year "cooling off' period coincided with
an upsurge in public concern about the Antarctic ozone hole. This
51. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 2.
52. See BENEDICK, supra note 5, ch. 5.
53. Id. ch. 6.
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heightened attention to the stratospheric ozone problem broke the deadlock
and facilitated adoption of the Montreal Protocol in September 1987."4
The procedural "framework" mechanisms for exchange of information
and cooperation in research analogous to those institutionalized by the
Vienna Convention are already in place internationally for GHGs in the
form of the IPCC. The IPCC has also performed another function often
ascribed to the Vienna Convention: laying the groundwork for substantive
action through preliminary discussions. In addition, by facilitating an
extended discussion of scientific and policy questions in advance of the
adoption of legally binding commitments, the IPCC process serves very
much the same function as the one-year "cooling off' period that preceded
renegotiation of the CFC protocol. Accordingly, because of the IPCC's
important work, the need for a strictly procedural "framework" is consider-
ably lessened, if not eliminated altogether. Moreover, identifying a
"framework" convention as an interim goal that must precede consideration
of environmentally efficacious targets could seriously undercut the
considerable momentum already generated on this issue. All these
considerations strongly suggest that a GHG convention could and should
be more aggressive than the Vienna Convention. In particular, there is an
urgent necessity for early consideration of substantive, environmentally
meaningful goals.
B. CO2 Targets Determined by Environmental Necessity
As discussed above,55 multilateral GHG instruments should estab-
lish a global goal of reducing as rapidly as possible emissions of GHGs
sufficient to reverse their current buildup in the atmosphere. Given that
the model of a convention with ancillary protocols has already been
adopted, the ongoing convention negotiations would presumably be the
earliest opportunity to set global emissions levels, at least for C0 2,
consistent with this goal. Unfortunately, even the most aggressive
proposals currently on the table, which call only for stabilization of CO2
emissions from industrialized countries, still will allow significant increases
in atmospheric concentrations of CO2.
Of all GHGs, C02 is responsible for the largest portion of the global
warming potential accumulating in the atmosphere. Apart from CFCs and
halons, C02 is also the GHG for which emissions reduction options are
54. Id. at 74.
55. See supra part II.B-C.
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most fully developed. Many of these options are cost-effective or involve net
benefits.56 To that extent, those options are analogous to the ban on
aerosol uses of CFCs adopted in the United States57 and other coun-
tries" in the 1970s, which produced savings to industry and the public as
a result of the substitution of less expensive propellants."
Consequently, halting the buildup of C02 in the atmosphere must be
the first priority for multilateral climate instruments. For instance, a
recent IPCC science assessment noted that a cut in C02 emissions of at
least sixty percent would be required just to stabilize atmospheric
concentrations of this gas.60 As discussed above, 61 a stringent but achiev-
able target that lowers the risk of catastrophic climate change is the
following: limitation of global emissions to assure that atmospheric
concentrations of C02 never exceed 400 ppm, with concentrations of C02
firmly established on a declining trajectory by the year 2030.
To achieve this goal, global emissions of carbon (as C02) from all
sources, which now total 6.4 to 8.3 gigatons (Gt) per year, would have to be
56. A recent report issued by the National Academy of Sciences proposed the
following policies for reducing CO 2 emissions from the United States: (1) encouraging
improvements in automobile fuel efficiency through a combination of regulation and tax
incentives; (2) nationwide building codes to improve energy efficiency; (3) strengthened
mandatory appliance efficiency standards; (4) restructuring public utility regulation to
encourage energy utilities to promote efficiency and conservation; (5) greater federal
and state support for mass transit; (6) public education and information programs
targeted at conservation and recycling; (7) increased federally-sponsored research and
development of energy-efficient and energy-conserving technologies; and (8) utilization
of federal procurement programs as demonstration projects for best-practice technolo-
gies and energy conservation programs. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 12.
57. 40 C.F.R. pt. 762; 43 Fed. Reg. 11,318 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 11,301 (1978) (banning
nonessential aerosol uses of CFCs).
58. A number of countries besides the United States, including Canada and the
Nordic nations, enacted similar controls on nonessential aerosol uses of CFCs. By
contrast, the European Community established a limit, considerably above then-existing
levels, on total production of CFCs. See THOMAS B. STOEL ET AL., FLUOROCARBON
REGULATION ch. 4 (1980).
59. See, e.g., id. at 47-48 (1980) (discussing economic assessment of banning aerosol
uses of CFCs); Daniel J. Dudek et al., Cutting the Cost of Environmental Policy: Lessons
from Business Response to CFC Regulation, '19 AMBIO 324, 326 (1990) (aerosol ban in
United States involved net saving to industry and public because prices of alternatives
less than those of CFCs); John S. Hoffman, Replacing CFCs: The Search for Alterna-
tives, 19 AMBIo 329, 331 (1990) (aerosol ban in United States involved net savings).
60. IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 5, 18.
61. See supra p. 88.
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limited to a total budget of approximately 200 Gt for the forty years-an
average of five Gt per year-between 1991 and 2030. To ensure declining
C0 2 concentrations after 2030, the total global emissions rate for C02
would have to be no more than 1 to 3 Gt of carbon per year by that time.
Interim goals, analogous to the twenty percent reduction target identified
by the 1988 Toronto conference,62 could and should also be established in
a GHG convention to facilitate smooth, measured, and steady progress
toward the ultimate aim. Because emissions from fossil fuel combustion
can be most easily controlled and verified, CO2 releases from the burning
of oil, natural gas, and-coal for industrial purposes or to generate electricity
should be the subject of near-term, specific reduction targets for industrial-
ized countries. However, the long-term global goal should include both
industrial and biotic CO2 emissions of anthropogenic origin. The climate
system does not distinguish between industrial releases and those of biotic
origin, such as forest clearing and burning, which currently account for ten
to thirty percent of C02 emissions.6 3 Furthermore, including both industri-
al and biotic emissions of anthropogenic origin in a C0 2 agreement allows
for a balancing of obligations, benefits, and other considerations of equity
in a broader context. If handled properly, inclusion of biotic sources and
sinks64 within the climate convention can create incentives for reforesta-
tion and can contribute to protection of biological diversity. For this to
occur, however, the agreement must place the highest priority on
preserving primary forests and must contain safeguards against environ-
mentally destructive forestry practices like large-scale monoculture tree
farms designed to create "sink plantations."
An attractive conceptual framework is the apportionment of responsi-
bilities based on national carbon "budgets" calculated according to a
specified formula." Two fundamental criteria appear to be relevant to the
calculation of carbon budgets. The first is national population, probably the
variable most closely connected with a "need" to emit C02, particularly as
a result of energy consumption. India, for example, has insisted that the
climate treaty articulate the principle that emissions from all States
converge at a common per capita level. To guarantee the intended
62. See Toronto Conference Statement, supra note 37.
63. IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 13, 17.
64. "Sink" refers to a mechanism resulting in the removal of C02 from the
atmosphere.
65. See, e.g., JOSHUA M. EPSTEIN & RAJ GUPTA, CONTROLLING THE GREENHOUSE
EFFECT: FIvE GLOBAL REGIMES COMPARED (1990) (Brookings Occasional Papers Series);
FLORENTIN KRAUSE ET AL., ENERGY POLICY IN THE GREENHOUSE (1989).
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environmental results from the treaty and to ensure that budgets remain
a stationary figure against which to measure future emissions, population
should be calculated as of a fixed base year, such as 1988.
Apportioning C02 emissions budgets strictly on the basis of national
population, however, is unlikely to be practicable. For instance, reductions
of total CO2 emissions from the United States of approximately seventy-five
percent would be required merely to bring per capita releases of this gas
down to the current global average of approximately 1.3 metric tons per
person.66 Although the United States and other disproportionately large
emitters must use their best efforts to reduce, even strenuous measures
would probably not produce annual cuts in emissions in excess of five
percent from a fixed baseline. Consequently, a second criterion--current
emissions, or a measure correlated with current emissions such as gross
national product (GNP)-should also be a component of the budget calcula-
tion. A formula that accounts for both these factors is probably the most
equitable and practical. Although the mix could be a subject of further
discussion, an apportionment of fifty percent of the global budget between
1990 and 2030 based on population and the remaining fifty percent based
on current emissions or GNP appears simultaneously to achieve three
goals: (1) environmentally meaningful, mandatory CO 2 emissions reduc-
tions in industrialized countries; (2) an equitable distribution of obligations
based on population; and (3) recognition of the lead time necessary to
reverse implicit commitments to continued C02 emissions resulting from
prior infrastructure investment decisions.67 For example, the United
States might receive a budget of twenty-five billion tons of carbon to emit
cumulatively between 1990 and 2030. The budget concept will also assure
that countries will receive "credit" for any emissions reductions they make
even before the entry into force of the agreement.
Articulating a global goal in terms of a worldwide carbon budget
implies, but does not require, subsequent apportionment of national
obligations by means of national carbon budgets. An alternative approach
is to frame the overall global endpoint in terms of percentage reductions
from a base year. This might but does not necessarily imply national
obligations framed in terms of percentage reductions from the base year,
similar to the strategy adopted in the Montreal Protocol. An appropriate
goal would then be an overall reduction in global C02 emissions levels of
66. EPSTEIN & GUPTA, supra note 65, at 18-25.
67. This formula can be made consistent with the call for convergence at a common
per capita emissions level by incorporating a transition to national allocations by a
strictly per capita formula beginning in some future year, such as 2030.
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twenty percent from 1988 to 2005 and an eighty percent reduction from
1988 to 2030. Although phrased in different terms, this is equivalent to the
carbon budget concept as a response to the magnitude of the global
warming problem.
C. Resource Transfers
The Montreal Protocol creates a special exemption for developing
countries. Provided that the annual CFC consumption of these countries
does not exceed 0.3 kilograms per capita, the Montreal Protocol entitles
them to a ten-year exemption from the agreement's control measures. After
this grace period, the Montreal Protocol requires of developing countries
the same uniform percentage reductions in total national consumption that
are required of all parties. Under the rubric of "common but differentiated
responsibilities," an analogous approach to the obligations of developing
countries appears to be well-accepted in the climate convention negotia-
tions. In particular, a number of developing countries have emphasized the
necessity for additional assistance, supplemental to existing foreign aid, to
offset the incremental costs those countries will incur in fulfilling the
obligations in the proposed GHG convention.
The Montreal Protocol contains explicit provisions for aid to
developing countries to underwrite the dissemination of alternative
technologies such as substitute chemicals and process changes for the
production of alternatives to ozone-depleting CFCs.6" The 1990 amend-
ments to the Montreal Protocol create a special Multilateral Fund
specifically for this purpose.69 Even before the entry into force of those
amendments, the Multilateral Fund is already in operation on an interim
basis with resources of approximately $200 million of voluntary contribu-
tions. The Multilateral Fund may reach as much as $240 million when
India becomes a party to the Montreal Protocol. The Multilateral Fund is
administered by an executive committee of fourteen parties consisting of
seven developed and seven developing countries and is implemented by
UNEP, the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), and the World
Bank.
70
68. Montreal Protocol as amended, supra note 5, art. 5.
69. Id. art. 10.
70. Id. art. 10.
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A related undertaking, known as the Global Environment Facility
(GEF)," is a voluntary $1.3 billion, three-year joint pilot undertaking of
UNEP, UNDP, and the World Bank. The GEF, administered by the World
Bank, is designed to provide concessional financing for environmentally
beneficial undertakings. It addresses four areas that might not be eligible
or attractive for multilateral bank financing or that might not otherwise be
a high priority for governments of developing countries: (1) limiting GHG
emissions through, for example, projects designed to improve energy
efficiency; (2) preserving biodiversity (variety of species); (3) combating the
degradation of international water resources; and (4) mitigating ozone
depletion from CFCs and other man-made chemicals. The bulk of
assistance on the stratospheric ozone issue is administered through the
Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol. The major exception is those
countries, primarily in eastern Europe, that are eligible for GEF financing
but that do not qualify as a low-consuming developing country under the
Montreal Protocol. Virtually all potential donor countries insist on using
the GEF as the principal conduit for assistance to developing countries
under the anticipated climate convention, thereby further magnifying the
precedential significance of the Facility.
Resource transfers to assist poorer countries are likely to be at least
as important for GHG agreements as they are for ozone depletion.
Technical assistance grants and concessional loans may be necessary for
up-front, start-up costs associated with forms of assistance largely
unfamiliar to development aid agencies. The dissemination of alternative,
environmentally benign options relying on wind, solar, biomass (plant
material and organic waste), tidal, and geothermal energy sources may
require infusions of new capital. Reforesting and conserving existing forest
resources in tropical countries will necessitate additional foreign exchange.
One way to finance these resource transfers would be a requirement for
countries to contribute to a fund in proportion to their CO2 emissions. In
countries with market economies, these contributions could be financed by
a tax on fossil fuel use. 2
The Multilateral Fund under the Montreal Protocol and the GEF,
while providing instructive examples in related areas, must be examined
71. See generally Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environ-
ment Facility, 30 I.L.M. 1735 (1991).
72. The European Community, for example, is now considering a proposal for a tax
on energy, a portion of which might be levied based upon carbon content. See E.C. Doc.
SEC(91)1744 (Oct. 14, 1991) (Commission communication to Council concerning
Community strategy to limit carbon dioxide emissions and to improve energy efficiency).
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carefully as precedents for resource transfers pursuant to a GHG conven-
tion. First, in contrast to both the Multilateral Fund and the GEF,
mandatory contributions of money may be necessary to meet the expenses
incurred by poorer countries in shouldering the obligations of a climate
convention and related protocols or other instruments. Second, developing
countries have stressed the need for additional resources supplemental to
development assistance already provided by donor countries to help them
combat global climate change. Without contesting this assertion, the goals
and quality of existing foreign aid must also be reexamined to assure
consistency with the purposes of these additional flows of resources while
simultaneously allowing Third World countries to meet their development
goals. Because donors had little if any involvement in the financing of
industries that produce or use CFCs and other ozone-destroying chemicals,
this was hardly an issue with respect to stratospheric ozone depletion. By
contrast, existing development assistance from multilateral and bilateral
donors in such environmentally sensitive sectors as energy and forestry are
substantial." All resource transfers should contain conditions to ensure
environmental quality and cost-effectiveness as measured by environmental
impact assessment and least cost energy planning methodologies. To
improve the prospects for long-term environmental sustainability, adequate
input from recipient country governments and, especially, the public in
receiving countries-the intended beneficiaries of this increased
assistance-should be assured."4
73. For example, the four multilateral development banks of which the United States
is a member-the World Bank (including the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the International Development Association, and the International Finance
Corporation), the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the
Inter-American Development Bank-approved about $5 to $6 billion per year in energy
lending in the 1980s. Energy is the second largest lending sector at the World Bank.
However, "[e]nd-use energy-efficiency has accounted for [only] about 1 percent of the
World Bank's total energy lending since 1980 . . . ."MICHAEL PHILIPS, THE LEAST COST
ENERGY PATH FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIEs: ENERGY EFFICIENT INVESTMENTS FOR THE
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS 52, 59 (1991).
74. See, e.g., Pat Aufderheide & Bruce M. Rich, Environmental Reform and the
Multilateral Banks, 5 WORLD POLY J. 301 (1988); Bruce M. Rich, The Emperor's New
Clothes: The World Bank and Environmental Reform, 7 WORLD POLY J. 305, 323-29
(1990); Bruce M. Rich, The Multilateral Development Banks, Environmental Policy, and
the United States, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 681, 741-45 (1985); David A. Wirth, Legitimacy,
Accountability, and Partnership: A Model for Advocacy on Third World Environmental
Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645 (1991).
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D. Trading Emissions Allocations
Calculating emissions reductions in terms of a comprehensive
"bundle" of GHGs and allowing international trading of emissions
allowances recently have been advocated as mechanisms for maximizing
economic efficiency within the environmental constraints established by
multilateral GHG instruments. The United States in particular has with
great vigor insisted that a GHG convention must satisfy these require-
ments.7" While intellectually attractive on the grounds of economic
efficiency, these proposals for trading among gases and between countries
involve serious practical concerns as to their implementation. Insistence on
trading of either sort, particularly in advance of agreement on global CO2
targets, could become a serious barrier to achieving genuine CO2 emissions
reductions.
In principle, it should be possible to agree on the contributions of
various GHGs to climate warming, through an analysis of chemical and
physical properties such as absorption strength and atmospheric life-
times.76 Permitting trading among gases, however, as described below,
would ignore the very real differences among those chemicals from a policy
point of view. One unfortunate consequence could be disruption and
unnecessary delay in the process of reaching agreement on global goals for
those chemicals, such as CO2, for which control options are readily
available.
The Montreal Protocol as amended provides an example of trading in
the ozone depletion context. It limits consumption and production of each
of three "baskets" of chemicals consisting of five CFCs identified in the
original 1987 agreement, ten other fully halogenated CFCs added by the
75. See generally AMERICA'S CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGY: AN ACTION AGENDA (1991)
(U.S. comprehensive approach); A "COMPREHENSIVE" APPROACH TO ADDRESSING
POTENTIAL GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE COMPREHEN-
SIVE APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE (1991) (report of interagency task force chaired by
Department of Justice); A "COMPREHENSIVE" APPROACH TO ADDRESSING POTENTIAL
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (1990) (disctission paper prepared by United States
Government for IPCC plenary meeting); Gray & Rivkin, supra note 28.
76. See, e.g., IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 47-61; Lashof & Ahuja,
supra note 7. Accounting for the indirect effect of each gas, however, is proving to be
quite difficult. For example, it is now believed that the GWP of NO. given in IPCC
Working Group I is wrong, and that the net GWP of CFCs should be lowered due to the
cooling effect of the ozone depletion that they cause. WMO Ozone Assessment, supra
note 7. The current uncertainty regarding GWP values is an additional reason to avoid
intergas trading, at least for now.
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1990 amendments, and three halons, respectively.77 The Montreal Protocol
specifies controls on production and consumption not of each chemical
within the basket, but of the basket as a whole, with the contribution of
each chemical to calculated levels of production and consumption weighted
according to its ozone-depleting potential. This formula permits each
country to determine for itself the reductions required in consumption and
production of each controlled substance, so long as the weighted levels of
consumption and production of each basket conform to the Montreal
Protocol's requirements.
Although the Montreal Protocol allows trading among CFCs and
halons that deplete ozone, similar trading among gases that contribute to
global warming is not necessarily good policy. CFCs and halons are strictly
man-made and emanate from readily identifiable and controllable sources.
By contrast, control options for the various GHGs are at substantially
different levels of development. Of non-CFC greenhouse gases, C0 2 is the
chemical for which the policy options are clearest. By contrast, baseline
emissions of methane, the next most important gas from the point of view
of contributions to the global warming problem, are highly uncertain.
Although emissions reduction techniques are being developed for specific
sources, comprehensive targets, covering all methane sources, individually
or as a component of a multigas "bundle," would be very difficult to
establish now or in the near future. Depending on the distribution of initial
allocations, trading among gases could also create disincentives for early
participation by low-C0 2, high-methane-emitting developing countries,
which may have little leverage in the negotiations. Given the disparate
state of development in emissions monitoring and control options for
various GHGs, delays in international progress on those portions of the
global warming problem that are easier to solve-particularly CO2 and
selected industrial sources of methane, such as coal mining and land-
fills-are a likely consequence of premature implementation of this
bundling approach.
Trading in emissions allowances among countries, as opposed to
among gases, presents different problems. The 1990 amendments to the
Montreal Protocol permit wholesale trading in production of the chemicals
regulated by that agreement, "provided that the total combined calculated
levels of production of the Parties concerned for any group of controlled
77. Montreal Protocol as amended, supra note 5, annexes A-B. Carbon tetrachloride
and methyl chloroform are each regulated separately, and no trading between them and
other chemicals is permitted. See supra note 6.
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substances do not exceed the production limits set out.., for that
group."78 Parties to the Protocol must document any international trading
arrangements by notifying the Secretariat to the Protocol.
International trading of emissions allocations for GHGs could provide
a mechanism for resource transfers to developing countries, provided that
agreement could be reached on an equitable allocation of initial allowances.
A variant of this concept is now reflected in the draft negotiating text,
which contemplates bilateral or multilateral arrangements through which
groups of countries can meet their treaty obligations cooperatively. Criteria
for these arrangements are to be established by the conference of the
parties to the convention. Presumably, this strategy has its greatest
application to situations in which industrialized countries find it more
economically efficient to pay for emissions reductions in developing
countries than in their own.
While these tradeable offset proposals may have theoretical appeal,
the practical obstacles to the successful implementation of such a system
are formidable.79 For example, an institutional structure to administer
and oversee the trading system very likely would be necessary. A
streamlined, informal procedure for adjudicating allegations of noncompli-
ance included in the 1990 amendments to the Montreal Protocol8° may
78. Id. art. 2, para. 5. Cf id. art. 1, para. 8 (defining "industrial rationalization" as
"the transfer of all or a portion of the calculated level of production of one Party to
another, for the purpose of achieving economic efficiencies or responding to anticipated
shortfalls in supply as a result of plant closures."). See 40 C.F.R. § 82.9(b)-(c) (1991)
(allowing increases in production allowances upon documentation of corresponding offset
by another Protocol party); 56 Fed. Reg. 49,548 (1991) (notice of proposed rulemaking
to conform to EPA regulations to 1990 Protocol amendments and stratospheric ozone
provisions of Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 601 & 602,
104 Stat. 2399, 2648-70 (1990), 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7671-7671q (Law. Co-op. Supp. June
1991)). Cf Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat.
2399, 2584-2631 (1990), 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7651-7651o (Law. Co-op Supp. June 1991)
(adding acid rain control program allowing trading of emissions allocations among
sources to Clean Air Act). With certain exceptions for extremely low-producing
countries, the original 1987 agreement limited the level of transferred production to
15% of a country's weighted 1986 production.
79. See, e.g., DAVID G. VICTOR, TRADEABLE PERMITS AND GREENHOUSE GAS
REDUCTIONS: SOME ISSUES FOR U.S. NEGOTIATORS (1990) (John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, discussion paper No. G-90-06).
80. See Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, Annex III (June 1990)
(establishing five-member Implementation Committee to rule on cases of asserted
failure to implement Montreal Protocol), reprinted in 1 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 591 (1990).
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represent some progress in this direction. Nonetheless, a supervisory
mechanism to assure that countries use the proceeds of emissions trades
for investments consistent with future global emissions budgets, not
currently included in the Montreal Protocol, probably also would be
required.
E. Institutional Issues
The international legal system, as currently structured, assumes
interaction among coequal, sovereign States. States can create legally
binding obligations through treaties, which are analogous to contracts, that
require the express consent of the States concerned. Sovereign States can
be bound absent express assent through long-standing custom and practice.
The creation and identification of these customary international legal
obligations, however, can be very slow and subject to considerable dispute.
Moreover, customary norms, even if they existed, are unlikely to be
sufficiently specific to protect the biosphere adequately from the worst
effects of global climate change."1
Accordingly, international solutions to the greenhouse problem are
mostlikely to come, if at all, from a multilateral treaty-making process.
Any country may decline to be bound by a multilateral agreement merely
by withholding its consent. Moreover, decisions at most international
conferences are taken by "consensus," which in practice implies unanimity.
Any single reluctant country can eviscerate or thwart an effective agree-
ment. Consequently, effective international solutions to global environmen-
tal problems can be held hostage to the national imperatives of virtually
every country. The necessity for consensus in multilateral processes can
create a built-in inertia, which may produce disappointing "least common
denominator" results that are not responsive to a particular problem. 2
Of course, progress can be made within the confines of existing
international structures. Nonetheless, the magnitude and urgency of the
greenhouse warming threat may overwhelm the capacity of existing
international mechanisms to respond effectively. For this reason, there
recently have been calls for nonconsensus decision-making procedures and
new institutions that would exercise some of the sovereign prerogatives of
States. For instance, the Declaration of the Hague asserts the need for a
81. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARv.
L. REV. 1484, 1521-50 (1991).
82. See PETER H. SAND, LESSONS LEARNED IN GLOBAL ENviRoNMENTAL GOVERNANCE
14-15 (1990).
BEYOND VIENNA AND MONTREAL
new international body that would operate pursuant to "such decision-
making procedures as may be effective even if, on occasion, unanimous
agreement has not been achieved." 3
The history of the Montreal Protocol demonstrates both the limita-
tions and possibilities of international procedures. On the one hand, the
Montreal process shows how particular countries can impede the purposes
of an international agreement. Although India now has indicated its
intention to accept the obligations of the revised Montreal Protocol when
the 1990 amendments enter into force, for some time there was consider-
able concern about that country's commitment to the agreement. Without
the participation of large, populous developing countries, atmospheric
chlorine levels would continue to increase, and the likelihood of a return
to pre-Antarctic hole atmospheric concentrations inthe foreseeable future
would be virtually nil.
On the other hand, the process for reassessing the Montreal Protocol's
efficacy is a modest step toward international approaches that transcend
the confines of the consensus model. For environmental issues like
stratospheric ozone depletion, in which the scientific knowledge underlying
treaty provisions is in a constant state of evolution, the reassessment of
international obligations is often desirable if not necessary. Under
customary international law, however, an amendment to a multilateral
treaty is binding only on those States that indicate their affirmative intent
to accept those new obligations, ordinarily through ratification of the
amendment.' Consequently, there is a serious risk that repeated amend-
ment of an agreement in light of new scientific developments will result in
the creation of classes of parties, each with its own configuration of
obligations depending upon the amendments to which it has acceded. This
danger is particularly grave in the case of complex, delicately-balanced
regulatory regimes like the Montreal Protocol.
While few would argue that the international community will or even
should adopt majority or supermajority voting procedures in the near
future, certain discrete areas may be especially fertile ground for depar-
tures from the consensus model through the adoption of more streamlined,
83. Declaration of the Hague, supra note 40.
84. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 40, para. 4,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969), and in 8 I.L.M. 679
(1969). This instrument, although not in force for United States, has been accepted by
the Executive Branch as a codification of customary international law regarding
international agreements. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES pt. II, introductory note (1987).
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quasi-legislative processes that nonetheless afford individual States
guarantees that their needs will be met. One area that is ripe for a
deviation from the consensus principle is that of amendments to existing
multilateral agreements. The Montreal Protocol expressly departs from the
customary rule for amending multilateral agreements by specifying
expressly that "adjustments" to the agreement's reduction schedule, which
are binding on all States party to the instrument, may be adopted by a
two-thirds majority instead of by consensus.85 At the time of the first re-
view and assessment of the Montreal Protocol's efficacy in 1990, the precise
meaning of "adjustment" was not clear. The parties to the Montreal
Protocol adopted an interpretation worthy of Solomon, in which revisions
to the reduction schedules for the eight chemicals originally covered by the
agreement are subject to the nonconsensus adjustment process, but the
addition of new chemicals requires a full-blown amendment. Nonetheless,
the adoption of binding rules by qualified majority has been firmly
established in the environmental sphere and may be a useful precedent in
the greenhouse context.
V. CONCLUSION
Preserving the integrity of the climate system requires early,
environmentally meaningful reductions in emissions of GHGs on a
multilateral basis. There is now an international consensus that a principal
component in the mechanism for accomplishing this task will be a
"framework" convention, or multilateral treaty. Even as a first step, a
framework convention should articulate a multilateral GHG control
strategy incorporating specific national commitments by industrialized
countries, while simultaneously encouraging additional unilateral action. 6
85. Montreal Protocol, supra note 5, art. 2, para. 9.
86. U.S. experience with the Montreal Protocol compellingly demonstrates the need
for the creation of incentives for additional national measures beyond the international
minimum. In response to the argument of some commenters that the Clean Air Act
contained more demanding requirements for the regulation ofozone-depleting chemicals
than the Montreal Protocol, the Environmental Protection Agency, in its final regulation
implementing the Montreal Protocol, interpreted the international instrument as
establishing not only an international minimum level for national regulations, but also,
based on prudential and strategic considerations, an affirmative limitation on the
stringency of domestic measures. 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566, 30,569, 30,573-74 (1988) (final
regulation implementing Montreal Protocol). This position of the Executive Branch has
now been reversed by Congress, which has enacted legislation regulating ozone-
depleting chemicals more strictly than the Montreal Protocol by requiring the following:
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A framework convention should not be viewed as a significant objective in
and of itself, but only as an interim step in the implementation of concrete
emissions reductions. A convention should include specific targets, at a
minimum for CO 2, sufficient to preserve the integrity of the climate system
with an adequate margin of error. It expressly should provide for resource
transfers to developing countries and address the need for new internation-
al institutions and decision-making procedures.
Unfortunately, the United States, a leader on the stratospheric ozone
issue, has dragged its feet on the global warming agreement. Indeed, the
moniker "no regrets" adopted by the Bush Administration to describe its
current policy demonstrates the inherently flawed bias of that position. The
only "regrets" contemplated by the Administration's policy are those that
result from environmental protection measures that subsequently prove
unnecessary. The costs of uncertainty and delay in the event of unantici-
pated catastrophes like the ozone hole or major losses of stratospheric
ozone over North America-or even of widely-accepted, if uncertain, predic-
tions of climate disruption-are dismissed altogether.
"Delays have dangerous ends,""7 wrote Shakespeare. This prudent
advice is nowhere more relevant than for global warming. Procrastination
today will cost dearly-perhaps not tomorrow, but certainly for the
tomorrows of our children.
(1) a larger number of intermediate reduction steps; (2) a phase-out of some alternatives
to substances controlled in the Montreal Protocol; (3) the introduction of a recycling
program; and (4) an additional requirement, not found in the Montreal Protocol,
specifying that substitutes for substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol must be
environmentally benign. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§
601-602, 104 Stat. 2399, 2648-70 (1990), 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7671-7671q (Law. Co-op Supp.
June 1991) (adding new §§ 601-618).
87. WILLiAi SHAKEsPEARE, HENRY VI, Part I, act III, sc. 2.
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